29 Years of the Digest ... founded August 21, 1981
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The Telecom Digest for July 17, 2011
Volume 30 : Issue 176 : "text" Format
====== 29 years of TELECOM Digest -- Founded August 21, 1981 ====== |
Telecom and VOIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) Digest for the
Internet. All contents here are copyrighted by Bill Horne and
the individual writers/correspondents. Articles may be used in other
journals or newsgroups, provided the writer's name and the Digest are
included in the fair use quote. By using -any name or email address-
included herein for -any- reason other than responding to an article
herein, you agree to pay a hundred dollars to the recipients of the
email.
Addresses herein are not to be added to any mailing list, nor to be
sold or given away without explicit written consent. Chain letters,
viruses, porn, spam, and miscellaneous junk are definitely unwelcome.
We must fight spam for the same reason we fight crime: not because we
are naive enough to believe that we will ever stamp it out, but because
we do not want the kind of world that results when no one stands
against crime. - Geoffrey Welsh
See the bottom of this issue for subscription and archive details
and the name of our lawyer, and other stuff of interest.
|
Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2011 22:05:29 -0400
From: Monty Solomon <monty@roscom.com>
To: telecomdigestmoderator.remove-this@and-this-too.telecom-digest.org.
Subject: APPLE-SA-2011-07-15-1 iOS 4.3.4 Software Update
Message-ID: <p0624085bca46a2097089@[10.0.1.4]>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
APPLE-SA-2011-07-15-1 iOS 4.3.4 Software Update
iOS 4.3.4 Software Update is now available and addresses the
following:
CoreGraphics
Available for:
iOS 3.0 through 4.3.3 for iPhone 3GS and iPhone 4 (GSM),
iOS 3.1 through 4.3.3 for iPod touch (3rd generation) and later,
iOS 3.2 through 4.3.3 for iPad
Impact: Viewing a maliciously crafted PDF file may lead to an
unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution
Description: A buffer overflow exists in FreeType's handling of
TrueType fonts. Viewing a maliciously crafted PDF file may lead to an
unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution.
CVE-ID
CVE-2010-3855
CoreGraphics
Available for:
iOS 3.0 through 4.3.3 for iPhone 3GS and iPhone 4 (GSM),
iOS 3.1 through 4.3.3 for iPod touch (3rd generation) and later,
iOS 3.2 through 4.3.3 for iPad
Impact: Viewing a maliciously crafted PDF file may lead to an
unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution
Description: A signedness issue exists in FreeType's handling of
Type 1 fonts. Viewing a maliciously crafted PDF file may lead to an
unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution.
CVE-ID
CVE-2011-0226
IOMobileFrameBuffer
Available for:
iOS 3.0 through 4.3.3 for iPhone 3GS and iPhone 4 (GSM),
iOS 3.1 through 4.3.3 for iPod touch (3rd generation) and later,
iOS 3.2 through 4.3.3 for iPad
Impact: Malicious code running as the user may gain system
privileges
Description: An invalid type conversion issue exists in the use of
IOMobileFrameBuffer queueing primitives, which may allow malicious
code running as the user to gain system privileges.
CVE-ID
CVE-2011-0227
Installation note:
This update is only available through iTunes, and will not appear
in your computer's Software Update application, or in the Apple
Downloads site. Make sure you have an Internet connection and have
installed the latest version of iTunes from www.apple.com/itunes/
iTunes will automatically check Apple's update server on its weekly
schedule. When an update is detected, it will download it. When
the iPhone, iPod touch or iPad is docked, iTunes will present the
user with the option to install the update. We recommend applying
the update immediately if possible. Selecting Don't Install will
present the option the next time you connect your iPhone, iPod touch,
or iPad.
The automatic update process may take up to a week depending on the
day that iTunes checks for updates. You may manually obtain the
update via the Check for Updates button within iTunes. After doing
this, the update can be applied when your iPhone, iPod touch, or iPad
is docked to your computer.
To check that the iPhone, iPod touch, or iPad has been updated:
* Navigate to Settings
* Select General
* Select About. The version after applying this update will be
"4.3.4 (8K2)".
Information will also be posted to the Apple Security Updates
web site: http://support.apple.com/kb/HT1222
This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key,
and details are available at:
https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/
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Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2011 22:05:29 -0400
From: Monty Solomon <monty@roscom.com>
To: telecomdigestmoderator.remove-this@and-this-too.telecom-digest.org.
Subject: APPLE-SA-2011-07-15-2 iOS 4.2.9 Software Update for iPhone
Message-ID: <p0624085cca46a22877c5@[10.0.1.4]>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
APPLE-SA-2011-07-15-2 iOS 4.2.9 Software Update for iPhone
iOS 4.2.9 Software Update for iPhone is now available and addresses
the following:
CoreGraphics
Available for: iOS 4.2.5 through 4.2.8 for iPhone 4 (CDMA)
Impact: Viewing a maliciously crafted PDF file may lead to an
unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution
Description: A buffer overflow exists in FreeType's handling of
TrueType font files. Viewing a maliciously crafted PDF file may lead
to an unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution.
CVE-ID
CVE-2010-3855
CoreGraphics
Available for: iOS 4.2.5 through 4.2.8 for iPhone 4 (CDMA)
Impact: Viewing a maliciously crafted PDF file may lead to an
unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution
Description: A signedness issue exists in FreeType's handling of
Type 1 fonts. Viewing a maliciously crafted PDF file may lead to an
unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution.
CVE-ID
CVE-2011-0226
IOMobileFrameBuffer
Available for: iOS 4.2.5 through 4.2.8 for iPhone 4 (CDMA)
Impact: Malicious code running as the user may gain system
privileges
Description: An invalid type conversion issue exists in the use of
IOMobileFrameBuffer queueing primitives, which may allow malicious
code running as the user to gain system privileges.
CVE-ID
CVE-2011-0227
Installation note:
This update is only available through iTunes, and will not appear
in your computer's Software Update application, or in the Apple
Downloads site. Make sure you have an Internet connection and have
installed the latest version of iTunes from www.apple.com/itunes/
iTunes will automatically check Apple's update server on its weekly
schedule. When an update is detected, it will download it. When
the iPhone, iPod touch or iPad is docked, iTunes will present the
user with the option to install the update. We recommend applying
the update immediately if possible. Selecting Don't Install will
present the option the next time you connect your iPhone, iPod touch,
or iPad.
The automatic update process may take up to a week depending on the
day that iTunes checks for updates. You may manually obtain the
update via the Check for Updates button within iTunes. After doing
this, the update can be applied when your iPhone, iPod touch, or iPad
is docked to your computer.
To check that the iPhone, iPod touch, or iPad has been updated:
* Navigate to Settings
* Select General
* Select About. The version after applying this update will be
"4.2.9 (8E501)".
Information will also be posted to the Apple Security Updates
web site: http://support.apple.com/kb/HT1222
This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key,
and details are available at:
https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/
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Date: Sat, 16 Jul 2011 23:19:37 +1000
From: David Clayton <dcstarbox-usenet@yahoo.com.au>
To: telecomdigestmoderator.remove-this@and-this-too.telecom-digest.org.
Subject: Neighbour from hell hacker gets 18 years in jail
Message-ID: <pan.2011.07.16.13.19.35.724765@yahoo.com.au>
'I'm going to kill you': neighbour from hell hacker gets 18 years jail
Asher Moses
July 14, 2011
A US man has been jailed for 18 years for waging a "campaign of terror"
against his neighbours, using their Wi-Fi to frame them for child
pornography, sexual harassment and other misconduct.
Barry Ardolf, 46, repeatedly hacked into the Wi-Fi network of his
neighbours, Matt and Bethany Kostolnik, as part of an elaborate revenge
scheme after they reported him to police for kissing their four-year-old
son.
He created fake email accounts and online profiles in their name and used
them to harass superiors and co-workers and send death threats to US Vice
President Joe Biden.
In court documents the prosecution argued Ardolf was a "dangerous man" who
sought revenge on his neighbours in a "bizarre and calculated campaign of
terror against them".
He "inflicted unfathomable psychic damage" on them, expressed no remorse
for his action and had in fact previously been caught terrorising a former
neighbour.
"He had stolen a former neighbor's mail, hacked into their wireless
system, stolen personal financial data off their computers, and sent
threats intended to terrify them - all because the personal care
attendants for the neighbor's disabled daughters parked in front of
Ardolf's house," the US Government attorneys wrote.
The case comes after another US man was raided by heavily armed federal
agents earlier this year after someone else used his wireless network to
access child pornography.
It is understood there have been cases in Australia where people have used
others' Wi-Fi networks to commit fraud and child abuse offences, however,
specific examples were not immediately available.
'We've just moved next door to a pedophile'
The Kostolniks moved into their "dream home" in August with their two
children, both under five years old, and another baby on the way.
Their four-year-old son, W.K, wandered into Ardolf's yard to climb on an
inviting play set and Ardolf began to play with the boy, repeatedly saying
"bet you can't touch me".
Soon after, Ardolf planted a "wet kiss" on W.K, prompting Bethany to pull
him inside. She ran upstairs crying, telling her husband "we've just moved
next door to a pedophile".
Ardolf admitted to the kiss when confronted by Matt, who then reported the
incident to police. This was apparently the incident that set Ardolf off
and prompted him to begin his campaign of Wi-Fi terror.
Recounting in court how Ardolf had made life hell for her family over two
years, Bethany Kostolnik reportedly said: "My husband and I had to explain
to our young, innocent children way too early that there are evil people
in the world - and to never go in Barry Ardolf's yard."
In November 2008, Ardolf is believed to have slashed the tires on the
Kostolniks' car and created fake email accounts and a MySpace page in
Matt's name.
'You are such a fox'
In February 2009, he used password-cracking software to gain access to
their wireless router and he was then able to access the family's
computers and use the internet as though he was in their house.
Also in February Ardolf, via the Kostolniks' router, accessed a Yahoo
email account he created in Matt's named and, posing as him, sent
suggestive emails and child pornography to his coworkers.
"You are such a fox ... I wouldn't mind at all if you wanted to sneak me a
kiss when nobody is looking," read one email sent to Matt's administrative
assistant Brenda Murphy.
The child pornography showed graphic images of minors engaged in sex acts
and the files were labelled with names such as "Matt's Kids.jpg".
The same images were uploaded to the bogus Matt Kostolnik MySpace page.
In March 2009 the chair of Kostolnik's environment law practice group and
another colleague received an email purportedly from a woman alleging Matt
made sexual advances against her.
These were later found to have been sent by Ardolf and resulted in an
outside firm being hired to conduct a full investigation into Kostolnik's
computer and network.
A forensic investigator found the Kostolniks' wireless network was
protected with encryption but had been accessed by an unknown computer.
Secret Service come knocking
In April and May 2009 the Secret Service visited Matt at his workplace
after receiving an email from a Yahoo address in his name that contained a
death threat against the US Vice President. The same email was sent to
multiple public officials.
"I swear to God I'm going to kill you," part of the email to Biden read.
Further Secret Service and FBI investigations uncovered Ardolf's actions
and authorities soon obtained a search warrant for his house, which was
carried out on July 21 2009.
The search found reams of evidence implicating Ardolf in creating the fake
email accounts and sending the nasty messages.
There was also a dossier of information on Bethany alongside a plan to
target her co-workers, more evidence of harassment of Matt and a
collection of books with instructions on breaking wireless network
encryption.
One draft email which was to be sent to Bethany from a fictitious woman
read: "I know your husband Matt, he is a lawyer of course. [W]e had sex
just before you had your baby this past fall."
Previous neighbours also targeted
Ardolf, who had been terminated from his job as a technician at medical
devices company Medtronic, was also found during the search to have
committed similar acts against his former neighbours.
In June 2010 he agreed to plead guilty in exchange for a two- to five-year
sentence. But just before the plea hearing Ardolf fired and replaced his
lawyer and decided to withdraw from his agreement to plead guilty.
He was released briefly but taken into custody in July for breaking
release conditions that he not use a computer.
On December 17 2010, three days into his trial, Ardolf plead guilty on all
counts with which he was charged.
Then, in March this year, he moved to withdraw his guilty plea arguing his
was coerced. But the prosecuting US attorney rejected his requests to
arrange another deal and held him to the plea.
Ardolf was also caught coaching his family on how to reply to questions in
court and give other evidence.
US District Judge Donovan Frank, after listening to the tearful testimony
of Bethany Kostolnik, sentenced Ardolf this week to 18 years in jail.
His attorney Kevin O'Brien told Wired that "it was a lengthy sentence for
a first-time offender".
Read more:
http://www.theage.com.au/technology/technology-news/im-going-to-kill-you-neighbour-from-hell-hacker-gets-18-years-jail-20110714-1hfb9.html#ixzz1SH37lmAY
Date: Thu, 14 Jul 2011 19:51:55 -0500
From: bonomi@host122.r-bonomi.com (Robert Bonomi)
To: telecomdigestmoderator.remove-this@and-this-too.telecom-digest.org.
Subject: Re: Tracing Calls w/Spoofed Numbers?
Message-ID: <RISdnV5_ubW2EoLTnZ2dnUVZ_gGdnZ2d@posted.nuvoxcommunications>
In article <gmqt17lk33s4khd1mfgtjudeet1v33o37t@4ax.com>,
\(PeteCresswell\) <x@y.Invalid> wrote:
>Is this even possible - given the resources of a government?
>
>I keep getting these lame-sounding letters from the Pennsylvania
>(USA) AG's office explaining why they can't do anything about
>telephone solicitors calling my cell phone.
>
>The reason given is that they are offshore, spoofing CallerID,
>and/or relaying calls through multiple servers.
>
>But the cynic in me thinks that if those same calls were to a
>high-ranking politician, perhaps threatening bodily harm... that
>the NSA would be all over the perp in a matter of days - if not
>hours or minutes.
>
>Am I wrong?
Yes, you are,
But not necessarily for the reasons you think. <grin>
IF the call originates outside the country, the State AG's office doesn't
have the legal authority to demand info about the caller from that 'foreign'
telephone company.
Also, the NSA, being a Federal agency does =not= 'take orders' from any
state agency.
'Spoofed' caller-id is 'merely' an impediment to tracing the call, not an
absolute barrier. Your phone company has records of where that call that
made your phone ring 'came from' -- either the line within that phone
company, or the 'trunk' from another phone company it came in over. (they
are guaranteed to have that information, along with start/end times -- for
inter-telco 'settlement', if nothing else). If the call came to them from
'another phone company', then that phone company has the same information
about where they got the call. "And so on", back to the call origin.
Unfortunately, the telco 'settlement' data is NOT organized in a manner
that makes it 'easy' to find a particular call record. Thus telco's will
frequently claim that the information requested is just 'not available'.
Tracing a call back to it's origin this way is slow, time-consuming, and
_expensive_.
It is a fact -- an unfortunate one, but a fact nonetheless -- that the
State AG office has a limited budget to work with. They have to
'prioritize' the things they investigate and/or prosecute. How they do
that is their prerogative. Generally, they go for the things that give
the most benefit to the most people, for the least 'cost'.
Like it or not, the 'proscribed' calls to your cell phone are a very
low priority item -- tracking down and eliminating any _particular_
perpetrator simply wouldn't make much of an impact on =any= recipient
of those calls, NOR would it make any significant difference in the
over-all problem.
Now, if -you- can identify who the caller is, and establish that
they're inside the U.S.A., such a complaint to the AG has a much
better chance of action. In fact, you can also sue them directly.
Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2011 02:18:29 +0000 (UTC)
From: tls@panix.com (Thor Lancelot Simon)
To: telecomdigestmoderator.remove-this@and-this-too.telecom-digest.org.
Subject: Re: Tracing Calls w/Spoofed Numbers?
Message-ID: <ivo81l$ai1$1@reader1.panix.com>
In article <gmqt17lk33s4khd1mfgtjudeet1v33o37t@4ax.com>,
\(PeteCresswell\) <x@y.Invalid> wrote:
>
>But the cynic in me thinks that if those same calls were to a
>high-ranking politician, perhaps threatening bodily harm... that
>the NSA would be all over the perp in a matter of days - if not
>hours or minutes.
>
>Am I wrong?
You're wrong about "hours or minutes". They'd have to see several
calls to trace back through each intermediate carrier -- there is
nothing like record-source-route for SS7.
--
Thor Lancelot Simon tls@panix.com
"All of my opinions are consistent, but I cannot present them all
at once." -Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On The Social Contract
Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2011 21:26:35 +0000 (UTC)
From: tls@panix.com (Thor Lancelot Simon)
To: telecomdigestmoderator.remove-this@and-this-too.telecom-digest.org.
Subject: Re: Most cellphone voice mail is vulnerable to hackers
Message-ID: <ivqbab$oh4$1@reader1.panix.com>
In article <pan.2011.07.14.13.43.32.48944@yahoo.com.au>,
David Clayton <dcstarbox-usenet@yahoo.com.au> wrote:
>>
>> It is done using a readily available online service known as "caller ID
>> spoofing,'' which can make a call appear to be coming from any phone
>> number. Hackers can use it to access someone else's voice mail messages by
>> fooling the system into thinking the call is coming from the owner's
>> cellphone.
>............
>I seem to remember that Voice Mail services from network providers used
>the secure ID data (used for 1-800 etc.), not the stuff that can be
>spoofed and appears on your phone.
No. There is no "secure ID data". The number used for 800 number
billing is delivered by a service called ANI, which delivers the BTN,
the *Billing Telephone Number* for a given account. This is much harder
to spoof, but will also be identical for many different phones billed to
the same company -- so is not useful for purposes like identifying a
voicemail customer.
However, and of more relevance, the Caling Number Identification that
is transmitted for display purposes with each telephone call has an
associated flag: "customer provided" or "network provided". No voicemail
system should EVER accept "customer provided" Calling Number as a
reason to let the user into an account without the password.
To transmit calling number identification into the PSTN and have it
marked as "network provided" a trunk must either be SS7 or ISDN and
marked as connected to network-side, not customer-side, equipment.
It is my understanding that certain unscrupulous VOIP providers have
managed to have their SS7 or ISDN trunks connected to the PSTN by
other carriers and marked as "network-side" so they can forge
calling number identifcation and claim it is "network provided".
There is another problem, that many handsets (analog sets with caller ID,
even cellphones which easily could display whether a "calling number"
is network provided or customer-provided) do not display when a number
is customer provided and thus likely forged. But this excuse does not
apply to voicemail systems.
Cellphones should, anyway, be fixed to display clearly that number is
"customer-provided". The protocols and firmware for these things are
tweaked constantly and it would be a very minor and valuable change.
The carriers providing the "network-side" SS7 or ISDN interconnection
that makes the forgery work against devices that do know about
"customer provided" numbers (e.g. voicemail systems) should be forced
to stop doing so -- the FCC should force all carriers with SS7 point
codes allocated in the North American numbering space to certify that
they are not doing this -- and the parties who were interconnecting to
them and doing it sued into oblivion. You know, that's just my opinion,
the rest of it above is just the facts, man.
--
Thor Lancelot Simon tls@panix.com
"All of my opinions are consistent, but I cannot present them all
at once." -Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On The Social Contract
Date: Sat, 16 Jul 2011 00:07:02 -0500
From: bonomi@host122.r-bonomi.com (Robert Bonomi)
To: telecomdigestmoderator.remove-this@and-this-too.telecom-digest.org.
Subject: Re: Most cellphone voice mail is vulnerable to hackers
Message-ID: <PIudnWR5cLjrgbzTnZ2dnUVZ_vmdnZ2d@posted.nuvoxcommunications>
In article <0bg0271pmaq1fh4aglc9nokfk5e7h8cbuu@4ax.com>,
Pete Cresswell <x@y.Invalid.telecom-digest.org> wrote:
>Per David Lesher:
>>A host is a host from coast to coast.................wb8foz@nrk.com
>>& no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX
>>Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433
>>is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433
>
>Is the verse to defeat 'bots?
>
>If so, is that a real email addr... and does the verse work?
It will defeat only the dumbest of harvesters.
***** Moderator's Note *****
Not necessarily: I've been working on regular expressions to help me
process the daily digest, so this subject has been on my mind, and
there's a big 'gotcha' in David's .sig file: his email address is next
to a character (a period) that is valid in emails.
>From what little I've seen of spammers and their software, that would
defeat the majority of harvesters. The "dumbest" harvesters confine
themselves to "From:" lines, since that is low-hanging fruit, but
picking emails out of the body of Usenet posts isn't that easy. I
could write a regular expression that finds any at-sign, and then
includes everything on either side that is valid in an email address:
the trick, however, is knowing when to stop.
This isn't a forum for regexp design, so I'll just say that I don't
think there's a whole lot of sophistication in harvest bots.
Bill Horne
Moderator
P.S. BTW, anyone who knows how to inlcude newlines in emacs
replace-regexp commands, please contact me offline via
bill at horne dit net.
TELECOM Digest is an electronic journal devoted mostly to telecom-
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