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Message Digest
Volume 28 : Issue 166 : "text" Format
Messages in this Issue:
Re: Usenet newsgroups
4-/10-party lines
Re: 4-/10-party lines
Re: 4-/10-party lines
Re: 4-/10-party lines
iPhone gulps AT&T network capacity
Re: Pulse dialing overhead, was: ANI vs. Caller ID
APPLE-SA-2009-06-17-1 iPhone OS 3.0 Software Update
Touch Tone Charges - Bell Canada Still Charges Extra $2.80 a month
Re: Pulse dialing overhead, was: ANI vs. Caller ID
Re: ANI vs. Caller ID (fwd)
5XB arcana
====== 27 years of TELECOM Digest -- Founded August 21, 1981 ======
Telecom and VOIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) Digest for the
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===========================
See the bottom of this issue for subscription and archive details
and the name of our lawyer, and other stuff of interest.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2009 23:41:34 -0700
From: Thad Floryan <thad@thadlabs.com>
To: redacted@invalid.telecom.csail.mit.edu
Subject: Re: Usenet newsgroups
Message-ID: <4A39E19E.4030601@thadlabs.com>
On 6/17/2009 12:51 PM, Scott Dorsey wrote:
> [...]
> The scary part is that most of the Google users appear to believe that
> Google Groups is some sort of proprietary messaging system or a web blog
> of some kind, and Google seems to encourage this. Take a look at the
> interface and there is no mention of Usenet or newsgroups at all.
It would appear you haven't used Google Groups. See this page screenshot
for Google Groups' comp.dcom.telecom:
<http://thadlabs.com/PIX/GG_comp.dcom.telecom.jpg>;
Look halfway down, right column, and you'll notice:
"This is a Usenet group - learn more" [link to Usenet info page, which is
here: <http://groups.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=46854>]
Though I now use eternal-september.org (formerly Motzarella) for most NNTP
purposes, Google Groups is useful for their archives. I recently located a
series of articles circa 1992 in a comp.* group to answer a current question
regarding hardware with which I was involved back then.
As I posted here a week ago, I use local system files which are identical on
my Linux, UNIX, and Windows systems to access both Yahoo and Google Groups:
http://thadlabs.com/PIX/home_page_display.jpg
http://thadlabs.com/PIX/groups_selector_page.jpg
http://thadlabs.com/PIX/GG_comp.dcom.telecom.jpg
http://thadlabs.com/PIX/comp.dcom.telecom_thread.jpg
The Google Groups "home" page showing my subscribed (only) Usenet newsgroups
can be seen here:
http://thadlabs.com/PIX/GG_home.jpg
Their 28 years' Usenet archives makes Google Groups a useful resource; one of
my articles in sci.math from 1988 can be seen here:
http://groups.google.com/group/sci.math/msg/d6c891302914fd84 and here:
http://groups.google.co.jp/group/sci.math/msg/d6c891302914fd84
28 years (back to 1981) far exceeds most/all NNTP servers' retention and expiry
policies.
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2009 01:24:04 -0700
From: Thad Floryan <thad@thadlabs.com>
To: redacted@invalid.telecom.csail.mit.edu
Subject: 4-/10-party lines
Message-ID: <4A39F9A4.1020107@thadlabs.com>
A fascinating article was posted a few minutes ago to the comp.os.linux.ubuntu
newsgroup off-topic in a thread about computer motherboards by John F. Morse.
I don't recall seeing any party-line-related articles here in 10+ years and it
doesn't appear John F. Morse has ever posted here (per a Google search), so you
might find this interesting, too.
Copy'n'pasted article follows:
Those 4-party lines used a small three-wire gas vacuum tube in the
phones. It wasn't a "triode" but actually a gas-fired (ignited) diode.
It was wired differently in the phones to pass superimposed ringing
current depending on whether the party was #1 or #3. The party #2 and #4
simply used the opposite side of the line (the return in both cases was
ground).
Party #1 and #3 were wired ring-to-ground, while party #2 and #4 were
wired tip-to-ground.
Tip and ring are terms from the old manual switchboard days, with tip
having a positive polarity and ring a negative, usually ~48 VDC. The
ringing current was 85-130 VAC, 20 Hertz (usually, but read on)
superimposed on the ~48 VDC.
Tip was the green wire, and ring was red. If colors were not used, then
ring had a ridge on the side of a cable, like a drop wire, or was on the
right when terminals were side-by-side, or behind (rear of) the tip
terminal. Memory aid is all "R"s: Ring-Right-Ridge-Rear.
When terminals were one above another, then it was "Tip-Top."
Two-party lines didn't require the tube. Single party lines didn't ring
to ground, but across the line, tip-to-ring. The ringers in each phone
set were therefore wired to respond to the proper party position.
In most central offices, the numbers ending in 000 through 499 had one
superimposed polarity, while numbers 500-999 had the opposite. This
allowed 4-party lines to ring without anyone hearing the other party
ringing. However, it made moving party "fills" difficult without
changing someone's number ("lines" and "numbers" are not associated
together). These "fills" were made to irritate people, so they wouldn't
ride along for free on a lightly-loaded multi-party line.
The 8-party lines (and more) used the old long and short ringing
signals, and were in the old manual switchboard days, usually for rural
areas where open wire lines would run for miles.
Those 10-party lines in Alaska (and many other non-Bell areas), used
either a harmonic ringer or a Decimonic ringer.
The harmonic ringers responded to different ringing frequencies. They
had different weights on the clapper arm which acted like a tuning fork.
They would only respond to a narrow ringing frequency, which were
something like 8 Hz, 16 Hz, 24 Hz, 33 Hz, 41 Hz. Back then we didn't
have Hz (Hertz), but CPS (Cycles per Second).
The Decimonic ringers used "decimal" frequencies like 10 Hz, 20 Hz, 30
Hz, 40 Hz, 50 Hz.
Both of these harmonic schemes were available in automatic dial central
offices. By ringing tip-to-ground and ring-to-ground, these five
frequencies could serve 10 different telephones on one line.
One of the most stupid things I saw when I was installing phones for
Southwestern Bell Telephone Company around 1969, was when I went to a
new customer's house to install a 2-party service. This elderly guy was
a roommate of another old dude who already had a 2-party line in that house.
You guessed it! The assignment center assigned the new customer to the
same line, so I really had no real wiring to do at their house. Just
connect the second phone reversed from the first one.
Yes, they each had their own "private" ringing, but only one of them
could use their phone at the same time, which is how any party line
works. The oddity is they each paid about 70% of what a "straight" line
would have cost, and only gained separate ringing.
Since they lived in the same house, I though it would be easier, and
certainly cheaper, for any caller to simply ask for the opposite
roommate if they wanted them.
Instead of paying a 140% telephone bill.
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2009 15:35:19 +0000 (UTC)
From: richgr@panix.com (Rich Greenberg)
To: redacted@invalid.telecom.csail.mit.edu
Subject: Re: 4-/10-party lines
Message-ID: <h1dmrn$2er$1@reader1.panix.com>
In article <4A39F9A4.1020107@thadlabs.com>,
Thad Floryan <thad@thadlabs.com> wrote:
[...]
>Yes, they each had their own "private" ringing, but only one of them
>could use their phone at the same time, which is how any party line
>works. The oddity is they each paid about 70% of what a "straight" line
>would have cost, and only gained separate ringing.
>
>Since they lived in the same house, I though it would be easier, and
>certainly cheaper, for any caller to simply ask for the opposite
>roommate if they wanted them.
>
>Instead of paying a 140% telephone bill.
I would hazard a WAG that the elderly gents preferred getting 2 seperate
bills, each with their own LD charges already seperated instead of one
combined bill where they needed to seperate out who made this LD call.
--
Rich Greenberg N Ft Myers, FL, USA richgr atsign panix.com + 1 239 543 1353
Eastern time. N6LRT I speak for myself & my dogs only. VM'er since CP-67
Canines:Val, Red, Shasta & Casey (RIP), Red & Zero, Siberians Owner:Chinook-L
Retired at the beach Asst Owner:Sibernet-L
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2009 09:45:59 -0700 (PDT)
From: hancock4@bbs.cpcn.com
To: redacted@invalid.telecom.csail.mit.edu
Subject: Re: 4-/10-party lines
Message-ID: <ccf687c2-6f83-4f7c-8de6-7fa844360261@o20g2000vbh.googlegroups.com>
On Jun 18, 10:17 am, Thad Floryan <t...@thadlabs.com> wrote:
> Those 4-party lines used a small three-wire gas vacuum tube in the
> phones. It wasn't a "triode" but actually a gas-fired (ignited) diode.
> It was wired differently in the phones to pass superimposed ringing
> current depending on whether the party was #1 or #3. The party #2 and #4
> simply used the opposite side of the line (the return in both cases was
> ground).
I'm not sure if Bell System 4 party phones required these gas tubes.
There were four ways of sending ringing current so 4-party phones
would be selectively rung. The Independents used a different system
(harmonics, as the post describes).
> In most central offices, the numbers ending in 000 through 499 had one
> superimposed polarity, while numbers 500-999 had the opposite.
Arrangement in step offices varied, as they also varied between Bell
and Independents.
Party lines were common in cities when Panel switching came out and
panel accomodated it. I don't believe Panel required specific number
assignments as Step did since the panel board did some translation.
> Yes, they each had their own "private" ringing, but only one of them
> could use their phone at the same time, which is how any party line
> works. The oddity is they each paid about 70% of what a "straight" line
> would have cost, and only gained separate ringing.
> Since they lived in the same house, I though it would be easier, and
> certainly cheaper, for any caller to simply ask for the opposite
> roommate if they wanted them.
> Instead of paying a 140% telephone bill.
But they also had two separate independent accounts with the phone
company.
Before cheap long distance, the monthly 'settle up' time for long
distance charges incurred by roommates often had conflict. This was
especially true in colleges for those who were far away from home,
but would apply to any transient. There would be expensive calls no
one would own up to making. Sometimes a roommate would leave leaving
the others with an unpaid long distance debt (it could be up to six
weeks between making a call and getting the bill for it). In 1969 a
college kid could easily run up a $30/month long distance bill and
that was serious money back then.
I can well understand why roommates would want separate phone bills,
even if it cost more. Heck, when I was younger and first got my own
phone line, I ordered it separately in my name, not as a second line
on my parents' account.
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2009 20:37:34 +0000 (UTC)
From: David Lesher <wb8foz@panix.com>
To: redacted@invalid.telecom.csail.mit.edu
Subject: Re: 4-/10-party lines
Message-ID: <h1e8ie$qcm$2@reader1.panix.com>
hancock4@bbs.cpcn.com writes:
>I'm not sure if Bell System 4 party phones required these gas tubes.
>There were four ways of sending ringing current so 4-party phones
>would be selectively rung. The Independents used a different system
>(harmonics, as the post describes).
I know of no scheme of selective 4-party ringing that Ma used, except
those the BSP described -- the gas tube system.
Independents used three frequency-selective schemes:
22, 33, 44, 55, 66 Hz.
20, 30, 40, 50, 60 Hz.
16.66, 33.33, 50, 66.66 Hz.
Which scheme they chose appears to have been a function of the kind of
ring generator they had in the central office.
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2009 08:59:43 -0400
From: Monty Solomon <monty@roscom.com>
To: redacted@invalid.telecom.csail.mit.edu
Subject: iPhone gulps AT&T network capacity
Message-ID: <p062408c0c65fea8d24e4@[10.0.1.3]>
IPhone gulps AT&T network capacity
'Tethering,' multimedia messaging service for 3G S version delayed
By Leslie Cauley
USA TODAY
NEW YORK -- AT&T's wireless network is having a hard time keeping up
with the Apple iPhone, a top wireless analyst says.
That's the reason AT&T isn't offering multimedia messaging and
"tethering" options for the new $199 iPhone 3G S -- lack of network
juice, says Roger Entner, head of telecom research for Nielsen.
When the iPhone 3G S was unveiled last week, Apple said it would
offer both those features. "Tethering" allows a wireless device to
serve as a broadband modem to provide over-the-air support for
laptops, PCs and the like. Multimedia messaging, or MMS, enables
users to attach video clips, audio files, pictures, etc. to text
messages.
But when the list of global carriers offering the features was
unveiled, AT&T wasn't on it. AT&T is the exclusive U.S. distributor.
AT&T says it plans to offer MMS "by the end of the summer," but it
has so far declined to say when tethering might become available. As
of Tuesday, that was still the case. The 3G S goes on sale Friday.
...
http://www.usatoday.com/printedition/money/20090617/iphone17_st.art.htm
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2009 07:09:26 -0700 (PDT)
From: hancock4@bbs.cpcn.com
To: redacted@invalid.telecom.csail.mit.edu
Subject: Re: Pulse dialing overhead, was: ANI vs. Caller ID
Message-ID: <8c05773d-10d8-4f19-afb1-1d3e3395915e@r3g2000vbp.googlegroups.com>
> Robert Bonomi wrote:
> > I repeat, "FALSE TO FACT".
>
> > First, there is _NO_ repetitive 'scanning of all lines' for
> > on-/off-hook status. That approach is TOO *DAMN* EXPENSIVE (in terms
> > of resource consumption) to be practical.
WRONG! [see, I can shout, too]
The Bell Labs introductory engineering textbook states that lines were
scanned for a change in _status_ in the No. 1/1A ESS, "expensive" or
not, that's what they did. Today it is likely handled by an interrupt
system, as described by Mr. Grigoni below. I
*In any event*, you must remember that signalling between the
subscriber and switch is STILL _DC_ off/on. A change in DC status
(current to no current or vice versa) indicates an 'event' has occured
that requires switch service. Usually that event is lifting the
receiver to make or answer a call, or hanging up to terminate a call.
But it can also be dial pulses. Software handles this, just as
software handles the difference between wanting to make a call or
answering a call (both initiated by going off hook, but are two
different situations.)
But, as stated before, the percentage of calll traffic using rotary
pulses is likely to be so small today that whatever extra machine
resources they may--or may not--require is insignificant in the larger
picture.
>> I'm not going to go into all the gory details, but the basic outline of
>> switch architecture
Could you provide the citation information for your source? Thanks.
> I have no knowledge of the RTOS or operating code in WECO switches,
> however I have programmed hard realtime systems and know that the best
> use of slots is for coding shared DSP tasks (such as filters) which
> run to completion or exit early to give more time to background tasks,
> and that pulse decoding, whether for bit-banging a serial interface or
> interpreting dial pulses from a telephone line can be handled by a
> properly managed priority interrupt system and do not consume realtime
> slots. I can't imagine that modern switch hardware would have any
> overhead issues with dial pulse decoding. Even 'asterisk' supports it
> without caveats on FXS hardware that detects it. Any perceived cost to
> an operating company regarding time to complete a call is also
> probably a red herring in today's environments. BTW, a polled
> environment is more deterministic and may well be the method of choice
> for scanning lines in a truly hard realtime implementation, and with
> modern hardware may well require less machine cycles than an
> interrupt-driven method (it would be my choice if designing a switch).
The above is correct and common practice for computer systems. For
the No. 1 ESS, they chose polling (scanning). In the 1A, they had a
separate signal processing handle that stuff. In our context--
interpreting dial pulses--it doesn't matter whether it is polling or
interrupts.
ESS also has to deal with a variety of inter-office singalling
arrangements, which may include DC pulse transmissions and signalling
from other offices of an older design. Now today everything is ESS
but when these boxes came out there was still a great deal of step and
panel out there.
>From 1976 to 1986 the Bell System and the successor baby bells
converted a massive number of electro-mechanical switches to ESS.
Pretty impressive achievement.
Would anyone know if the No. 4 ESS is still used as the long distance
switch or has it been superceded?
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2009 21:19:39 -0400
From: Monty Solomon <monty@roscom.com>
To: redacted@invalid.telecom.csail.mit.edu
Subject: APPLE-SA-2009-06-17-1 iPhone OS 3.0 Software Update
Message-ID: <p062408c2c66097e1c5b5@[10.0.1.3]>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
APPLE-SA-2009-06-17-1 iPhone OS 3.0 Software Update
iPhone OS 3.0 Software Update is now available and addresses the
following:
CoreGraphics
CVE-ID: CVE-2008-3623
Available for: iPhone OS 1.0 through 2.2.1,
iPhone OS for iPod touch 1.1 through 2.2.1
Impact: Viewing a maliciously crafted image may lead to an
unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution
Description: A heap buffer overflow exists in the handling of color
spaces within CoreGraphics. Viewing a maliciously crafted image may
lead to an unexpected application termination or arbitrary code
execution. This update addresses the issue through improved bounds
checking. Credit: Apple.
CoreGraphics
CVE-ID: CVE-2009-0145
Available for: iPhone OS 1.0 through 2.2.1,
iPhone OS for iPod touch 1.1 through 2.2.1
Impact: Opening a maliciously crafted PDF file may lead to an
unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution
Description: Multiple memory corruption issues exist in
CoreGraphics' handling of PDF files. Opening a maliciously crafted
PDF file may lead to an unexpected application termination or
arbitrary code execution. This update addresses the issues through
improved bounds and error checking.
CoreGraphics
CVE-ID: CVE-2009-0146, CVE-2009-0147, CVE-2009-0165
Available for: iPhone OS 1.0 through 2.2.1,
iPhone OS for iPod touch 1.1 through 2.2.1
Impact: Viewing or downloading a PDF file containing a maliciously
crafted JBIG2 stream may lead to an unexpected application
termination or arbitrary code execution
Description: Multiple heap buffer overflows exist in CoreGraphics'
handling of PDF files containing JBIG2 streams. Viewing or
downloading a PDF file containing a maliciously crafted JBIG2 stream
may lead to an unexpected application termination or arbitrary code
execution. This update addresses the issue through improved bounds
checking. Credit to Apple, Alin Rad Pop of Secunia Research, and Will
Dormann of CERT/CC for reporting this issue.
CoreGraphics
CVE-ID: CVE-2009-0155
Available for: iPhone OS 1.0 through 2.2.1,
iPhone OS for iPod touch 1.1 through 2.2.1
Impact: Opening a maliciously crafted PDF file may lead to an
unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution
Description: An integer underflow in CoreGraphics' handling of PDF
files may result in a heap buffer overflow. Opening a maliciously
crafted PDF file may lead to an unexpected application termination or
arbitrary code execution. This update addresses the issue through
improved bounds checking. Credit to Barry K. Nathan for reporting
this issue.
CoreGraphics
CVE-ID: CVE-2009-1179
Available for: iPhone OS 1.0 through 2.2.1,
iPhone OS for iPod touch 1.1 through 2.2.1
Impact: Opening a maliciously crafted PDF file may lead to an
unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution
Description: An integer overflow in CoreGraphics' handling of PDF
files may result in a heap buffer overflow. Opening a PDF file
containing a maliciously crafted JBIG2 stream may lead to an
unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution. This
update addresses the issue through improved bounds checking. Credit
to Will Dormann of CERT/CC for reporting this issue.
CoreGraphics
CVE-ID: CVE-2009-0946
Available for: iPhone OS 1.0 through 2.2.1,
iPhone OS for iPod touch 1.1 through 2.2.1
Impact: Multiple vulnerabilities in FreeType v2.3.8
Description: Multiple integer overflows exist in FreeType v2.3.8,
which may lead to an unexpected application termination or arbitrary
code execution. This update addresses the issues through improved
bounds checking. Credit to Tavis Ormandy of the Google Security Team
for reporting these issues.
Exchange
CVE-ID: CVE-2009-0958
Available for: iPhone OS 1.0 through 2.2.1,
iPhone OS for iPod touch 1.1 through 2.2.1
Impact: Connecting to a malicious Exchange server may lead to the
disclosure of sensitive information
Description: Accepting an untrusted Exchange server certificate
results in storing an exception on a per-hostname basis. On the next
visit to an Exchange server contained in the exception list, its
certificate is accepted with no prompt and validation. This may lead
to the disclosure of credentials or application data. This update
addresses the issue through improved handling of untrusted
certificate exceptions. Credit to FD of Securus Global for reporting
this issue.
ImageIO
CVE-ID: CVE-2009-0040
Available for: iPhone OS 1.0 through 2.2.1,
iPhone OS for iPod touch 1.1 through 2.2.1
Impact: Processing a maliciously crafted PNG image may lead to an
unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution
Description: An uninitialized pointer issue exists in the handling
of PNG images. Processing a maliciously crafted PNG image may lead to
an unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution.
This update addresses the issue through additional validation of PNG
images. Credit to Tavis Ormandy of Google Security Team for reporting
this issue.
International Components for Unicode
CVE-ID: CVE-2009-0153
Available for: iPhone OS 1.0 through 2.2.1,
iPhone OS for iPod touch 1.1 through 2.2.1
Impact: Maliciously crafted content may bypass website filters and
result in cross-site scripting
Description: An implementation issue exists in ICU's handling of
certain character encodings. Using ICU to convert invalid byte
sequences to Unicode may result in over-consumption, where trailing
bytes are considered part of the original character. This may be
leveraged by an attacker to bypass filters on websites that attempt
to mitigate cross-site scripting. This update addresses the issue
through improved handling of invalid byte sequences. Credit to Chris
Weber of Casaba Security for reporting this issue.
IPSec
CVE-ID: CVE-2008-3651, CVE-2008-3652
Available for: iPhone OS 1.0 through 2.2.1,
iPhone OS for iPod touch 1.1 through 2.2.1
Impact: Multiple vulnerabilities in the racoon daemon may lead to a
denial of service
Description: Multiple memory leaks exist in the racoon daemon in
ipsec-tools before 0.7.1, which may lead to a denial of service. This
update addresses the issues through improved memory management.
libxml
CVE-ID: CVE-2008-3281, CVE-2008-3529, CVE-2008-4409, CVE-2008-4225,
CVE-2008-4226
Available for: iPhone OS 1.0 through 2.2.1,
iPhone OS for iPod touch 1.1 through 2.2.1
Impact: Multiple vulnerabilities in libxml2 version 2.6.16
Description: Multiple vulnerabilities in libxml2 version 2.6.16, the
most serious of which may lead to an unexpected application
termination or arbitrary code execution. This update addresses the
issue by updating the libxml2 system library to version 2.7.3.
Mail
CVE-ID: CVE-2009-0960
Available for: iPhone OS 1.0 through 2.2.1,
iPhone OS for iPod touch 1.1 through 2.2.1
Impact: Users do not have control over the loading of remote images
in HTML messages
Description: Mail does not provide a preference to turn off the
automatic loading of remote images. Opening an HTML email containing
a remote image will automatically request it. The server hosting a
remote image can determine that the email was read, and the network
address of the device. This update addresses the issue by adding a
preference to turn off the automatic loading of remote images. Credit
to Ronald C.F. Antony of Cubiculum Systems, Stefan Seiz of ERNI
Electronics GmbH, Oskar Lissheim-Boethius of iPhone development house
OLB Productions, Meyer Consulting, Oliver Quas, Christian Schmitz of
MonkeybreadSoftware, Thomas Adams of TynTec, Aviv Raff of
aviv.raffon.net, and Collin Mulliner of Fraunhofer SIT for reporting
this issue.
Mail
CVE-ID: CVE-2009-0961
Available for: iPhone OS 1.0 through 2.2.1,
iPhone OS for iPod touch 1.1 through 2.2.1
Impact: An application that causes an alert to apear may initiate a
phone call without user interaction
Description: If an application causes an alert to apear while Mail's
call approval dialog is shown, the call will be placed without user
interaction. This update addresses the issue by not dismissing the
call approval dialog when other alerts appear. Credit to Collin
Mulliner of Fraunhofer SIT for reporting this issue.
MPEG-4 Video Codec
CVE-ID: CVE-2009-0959
Available for: iPhone OS 1.0 through 2.2.1,
iPhone OS for iPod touch 1.1 through 2.2.1
Impact: Viewing a maliciously crafted MPEG-4 video file may lead to
an unexpected device reset
Description: An input validation issue exists in the handling of
MPEG-4 video files. Viewing a maliciously crafted MPEG-4 video file
may lead to an unexpected device reset. This update addresses the
issue through improved handling of MPEG-4 video files. Credit to Si
Brindley for reporting this issue.
Profiles
CVE-ID: CVE-2009-1679
Available for: iPhone OS 1.0 through 2.2.1,
iPhone OS for iPod touch 1.1 through 2.2.1
Impact: Installing a configuration profile may weaken the passcode
policy defined by Exchange ActiveSync
Description: An issue in the handling of configuration profiles may
allow a weaker passcode policy to overwrite the passcode policy
already set via Exchange ActiveSync. This may allow a person with
physical access to the device to bypass the passcode policy set via
Exchange ActiveSync. This update addresses the issue through improved
handling of configuration profiles.
Safari
CVE-ID: CVE-2009-1680
Available for: iPhone OS 1.0 through 2.2.1,
iPhone OS for iPod touch 1.1 through 2.2.1
Impact: Clearing Safari's history via the Settings application does
not prevent disclosure of the search history to a person with
physical access to the device
Description: Clearing Safari's history via the Settings application
does not reset the search history. In this case, another person with
physical access to the device may be able to view the search history.
This update addresses the issue by removing the search history when
Safari's history is cleared via the Settings application. Credit to
Joshua Belsky for reporting this issue.
Safari
CVE-ID: CVE-2009-1681
Available for: iPhone OS 1.0 through 2.2.1,
iPhone OS for iPod touch 1.1 through 2.2.1
Impact: Interacting with a maliciously crafted website may result in
unexpected actions on other sites
Description: A design issue exists in the same-origin policy
mechanism used to limit interactions between websites. This policy
allows websites to load pages from third-party websites into a
subframe. This frame may be positioned to entice the user to click a
particular element within the frame, an attack referred to as
"clickjacking". A maliciously crafted website may be able to
manipulate a user into taking an unexpected action, such as
initiating a purchase. This update addresses the issue through
adoption of the industry-standard 'X-Frame-Options' extension header,
that allows individual web pages to opt out of being displayed within
a subframe.
Telephony
CVE-ID: CVE-2009-1683
Available for: iPhone OS 1.0 through 2.2.1,
iPhone OS for iPod touch 1.1 through 2.2.1
Impact: A remote attacker may cause an unexpected device reset
Description: A logic issue in the handling of ICMP echo request
packets may cause an assertion to be triggered. By sending a
maliciously crafted ICMP echo request packet, a remote attacker may
be able to cause an unexpected device reset. This update addresses
the issue by removing the assertion. Credit to Masaki Yoshida for
reporting this issue.
WebKit
CVE-ID: CVE-2008-2320
Available for: iPhone OS 1.0 through 2.2.1,
iPhone OS for iPod touch 1.1 through 2.2.1
Impact: Visiting a maliciously crafted website may lead to an
unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution
Description: A memory corruption issue exists in WebKit's handling
of invalid color strings in Cascading Style Sheets. Visiting a
maliciously crafted website may lead to an unexpected application
termination or arbitrary code execution. This update addresses the
issue through improved sanitization of color strings. Credit to
Thomas Raffetseder of the International Secure Systems Lab for
reporting this issue.
WebKit
CVE-ID: CVE-2009-0945
Available for: iPhone OS 1.0 through 2.2.1,
iPhone OS for iPod touch 1.1 through 2.2.1
Impact: Visiting a maliciously crafted website may lead to arbitrary
code execution
Description: A memory corruption issue exists in WebKit's handling
of SVGList objects. Visiting a maliciously crafted website may lead
to arbitrary code execution. This update addresses the issue through
improved bounds checking. Credit to Nils working with TippingPoint's
Zero Day Initiative for reporting this issue.
WebKit
CVE-ID: CVE-2009-1684
Available for: iPhone OS 1.0 through 2.2.1,
iPhone OS for iPod touch 1.1 through 2.2.1
Impact: Visiting a maliciously crafted website may result in cross-
site scripting
Description: A cross-site scripting issue exists in the separation
of JavaScript contexts. A maliciously crafted web page may use an
event handler to execute a script in the security context of the next
web page that is loaded in its window or frame. This update addresses
the issue by ensuring that event handlers are not able to directly
affect an in-progress page transition. Credit to Michal Zalewski of
Google Inc. for reporting this issue.
WebKit
CVE-ID: CVE-2009-1685
Available for: iPhone OS 1.0 through 2.2.1,
iPhone OS for iPod touch 1.1 through 2.2.1
Impact: Visiting a maliciously crafted website may result in cross-
site scripting
Description: A cross-site scripting issue exists in the separation
of JavaScript contexts. By enticing a user to visit a maliciously
crafted web page, the attacker may overwrite the
'document.implementation' of an embedded or parent document served
from a different security zone. This update addresses the issue by
ensuring that changes to 'document.implementation' do not affect
other documents. Credit to Dean McNamee of Google Inc. for reporting
this issue.
WebKit
CVE-ID: CVE-2009-1686
Available for: iPhone OS 1.0 through 2.2.1,
iPhone OS for iPod touch 1.1 through 2.2.1
Impact: Visiting a maliciously crafted website may lead to arbitrary
code execution
Description: A type conversion issue exists in WebKit's JavaScript
exception handling. When an attempt is made to assign the exception
to a variable that is declared as a constant, an object is cast to an
invalid type, causing memory corruption. Visiting a maliciously
crafted website may lead to an unexpected application termination or
arbitrary code execution. This update addresses the issue by ensuring
that assignment in a const declaration writes to the variable object.
Credit to Jesse Ruderman of Mozilla Corporation for reporting this
issue.
WebKit
CVE-ID: CVE-2009-1687
Available for: iPhone OS 1.0 through 2.2.1,
iPhone OS for iPod touch 1.1 through 2.2.1
Impact: Visiting a maliciously crafted website may lead to an
unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution
Description: A memory corruption issue exists in WebKit's JavaScript
garbage collector implementation. If an allocation fails, a memory
write to an offset of a NULL pointer may result, leading to an
unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution. This
update addresses the issue by checking for allocation failure. Credit
to SkyLined of Google Inc. for reporting this issue.
WebKit
CVE-ID: CVE-2009-1688, CVE-2009-1689
Available for: iPhone OS 1.0 through 2.2.1,
iPhone OS for iPod touch 1.1 through 2.2.1
Impact: Visiting a maliciously crafted website may result in a
cross-site scripting attack
Description: Multiple issues in WebKit's handling of javascript
objects may lead to a cross-site scripting attack. This update
addresses the issues through improved handling of cross-site
interaction with javascript objects. Credit to Adam Barth of UC
Berkeley, and Collin Jackson of Stanford University for reporting
these issues.
WebKit
CVE-ID: CVE-2009-1690
Available for: iPhone OS 1.0 through 2.2.1,
iPhone OS for iPod touch 1.1 through 2.2.1
Impact: Visiting a maliciously crafted website may result in an
unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution
Description: A memory corruption issue exists in WebKit's handling
of recursion in certain DOM event handlers. Visiting a maliciously
crafted website may lead to an unexpected application termination or
arbitrary code execution. This update addresses the issue through
improved memory management. Credit to SkyLined of Google Inc. for
reporting this issue.
WebKit
CVE-ID: CVE-2009-1691
Available for: iPhone OS 1.0 through 2.2.1,
iPhone OS for iPod touch 1.1 through 2.2.1
Impact: Visiting a maliciously crafted website may lead to cross-
site scripting
Description: A cross-site scripting issue in Safari allows a
maliciously crafted website to alter standard JavaScript prototypes
of websites served from a different domain. By enticing a user to
visit a maliciously crafted web page, an attacker may be able to
alter the execution of JavaScript served from other websites. This
update addresses the issue through improved access controls on these
prototypes.
WebKit
CVE-ID: CVE-2009-1692
Available for: iPhone OS 1.0 through 2.2.1,
iPhone OS for iPod touch 1.1 through 2.2.1
Impact: Visiting a maliciously crafted website may lead to an
unexpected device reset
Description: A memory consumption issue exists in the handling of
HTMLSelectElement objects. Visiting a maliciously crafted webpage
containing an HTMLSelectElement with a very large length attribute
may lead to an unexpected device reset. This update addresses the
issue through improved handling of HTMLSelectElement objects. Credit
to Thierry Zoller of G-SEC (www.g-sec.lu) for reporting this issue.
WebKit
CVE-ID: CVE-2009-1693
Available for: iPhone OS 1.0 through 2.2.1,
iPhone OS for iPod touch 1.1 through 2.2.1
Impact: Visiting a maliciously crafted website may disclose images
from other sites
Description: A cross-site image capture issue exists in WebKit. By
using a canvas with an SVG image, a maliciously crafted website may
load and capture an image from another website. This update addresses
the issue by restricting the reading of canvases that have images
loaded from other websites. Credit to Chris Evans of Google Inc. for
reporting this issue.
WebKit
CVE-ID: CVE-2009-1694
Available for: iPhone OS 1.0 through 2.2.1,
iPhone OS for iPod touch 1.1 through 2.2.1
Impact: Visiting a maliciously crafted website may disclose images
from other sites
Description: A cross-site image capture issue exists in WebKit. By
using a canvas and a redirect, a maliciously crafted website may load
and capture an image from another website. This update addresses the
issue through improving the handling of redirects. Credit to Chris
Evans of for reporting this issue.
WebKit
CVE-ID: CVE-2009-1695
Available for: iPhone OS 1.0 through 2.2.1,
iPhone OS for iPod touch 1.1 through 2.2.1
Impact: Visiting a maliciously crafted website may result in a
cross-site scripting attack
Description: An issue in WebKit allows the contents of a frame to be
accessed by an HTML document after a page transition has taken place.
This may allow a maliciously crafted website to perform a cross-site
scripting attack. This update addresses the issue through an improved
domain check. Credit to Feng Qian of Google Inc. for reporting this
issue.
WebKit
CVE-ID: CVE-2009-1696
Available for: iPhone OS 1.0 through 2.2.1,
iPhone OS for iPod touch 1.1 through 2.2.1
Impact: Websites may surreptitiously track users
Description: Safari generates random numbers for JavaScript
applications using a predictable algorithm. This could allow a
website to track a particular Safari session without using cookies,
hidden form elements, IP addresses, or other techniques. This update
addresses the issue by using a better random number generator. Credit
to Amit Klein of Trusteer for reporting this issue.
WebKit
CVE-ID: CVE-2009-1697
Available for: iPhone OS 1.0 through 2.2.1,
iPhone OS for iPod touch 1.1 through 2.2.1
Impact: Visiting a maliciously crafted website may result in a
cross-site scripting attack
Description: A CRLF injection issue exists in the handling of
XMLHttpRequest headers in WebKit. This may allow a malicious website
to bypass the same-origin policy by issuing an XMLHttpRequest that
does not contain a Host header. XMLHttpRequests without a Host header
may reach other websites on the same server, and allow attacker-
supplied JavaScript to interact with those sites. This update
addresses the issue through improved handling of XMLHttpRequest
headers. Credit to Per von Zweigbergk for reporting this issue.
WebKit
CVE-ID: CVE-2009-1698
Available for: iPhone OS 1.0 through 2.2.1,
iPhone OS for iPod touch 1.1 through 2.2.1
Impact: Viewing a maliciously crafted web page may lead to an
unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution
Description: An uninitialized pointer issue exists in the handling
of the CSS 'attr' function. Viewing a maliciously crafted web page
may lead to an unexpected application termination or arbitrary code
execution. This update addresses the issue through additional
validation of CSS elements. Credit to Thierry Zoller working with
TippingPoint's Zero Day Initiative, and Robert Swiecki of the Google
Security Team for reporting this as a security issue.
WebKit
CVE-ID: CVE-2009-1699
Available for: iPhone OS 1.0 through 2.2.1,
iPhone OS for iPod touch 1.1 through 2.2.1
Impact: Visiting a maliciously crafted website may result in an
information disclosure
Description: An XML External Entity issue exists in WebKit's
handling of XML. Visiting a maliciously crafted website may result in
the website being able to read files from the user's system. This
update addresses the issue by not loading external entities across
origins. Credit to Chris Evans of Google Inc. for reporting this
issue.
WebKit
CVE-ID: CVE-2009-1700
Available for: iPhone OS 1.0 through 2.2.1,
iPhone OS for iPod touch 1.1 through 2.2.1
Impact: Visiting a maliciously crafted website may result in the
disclosure of sensitive information
Description: WebKit does not properly handle redirects when
processing Extensible Stylesheet Language Transformations
(XSLT). This allows a maliciously crafted website to retrieve XML
content from pages on other websites, which could result in the
disclosure of sensitive information. This update addresses the issue
by ensuring that documents referenced in transformations are
downloaded from the same domain as the transformation itself. Credit
to Chris Evans of Google Inc. for reporting this issue.
WebKit
CVE-ID: CVE-2009-1701
Available for: iPhone OS 1.0 through 2.2.1,
iPhone OS for iPod touch 1.1 through 2.2.1
Impact: Visiting a maliciously crafted website may lead to an
unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution
Description: A use-after-free issue exists in WebKit's handling of
the JavaScript DOM. Visiting a maliciously crafted website may lead
to an unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution.
This update addresses the issue through improved handling of document
elements. Credit to wushi & ling of team509 working with
TippingPoint's Zero Day Initiative for reporting this issue.
WebKit
CVE-ID: CVE-2009-1702
Available for: iPhone OS 1.0 through 2.2.1,
iPhone OS for iPod touch 1.1 through 2.2.1
Impact: Visiting a malicious website may lead to a cross-site
scripting attack
Description: An issue in WebKit's handling of Location and History
objects may result in a cross-site scripting attack when visiting a
malicious website. This update addresses the issue through improved
handling of Location and History objects. Credit to Adam Barth and
Joel Weinberger of UC Berkeley for reporting this issue.
Installation note:
This update is only available through iTunes, and will not appear in
your computer's Software Update application, or in the Apple
Downloads site. Make sure you have an internet connection and have
installed the latest version of iTunes from www.apple.com/itunes/
iTunes will automatically check Apple's update server on its weekly
schedule. When an update is detected, it will download it. When
the iPhone or iPod touch is docked, iTunes will present the user with
the option to install the update. We recommend applying the update
immediately if possible. Selecting "don't install" will present the
option the next time you connect your iPhone or iPod touch.
The automatic update process may take up to a week depending on the
day that iTunes checks for updates. You may manually obtain the
update via the "Check for Update" button within iTunes. After doing
this, the update can be applied when your iPhone or iPod touch is
docked to your computer.
To check that the iPhone or iPod touch has been updated:
* Navigate to Settings
* Select General
* Select About. The version after applying this update will be
"3.0 (7A341)" or later
Information will also be posted to the Apple Security Updates
web site: http://support.apple.com/kb/HT1222
This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key,
and details are available at:
https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/
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------------------------------
Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2009 9:39:32 -0400
From: jwillis <jwillis.removethis@drlogick.com>
To: redacted@invalid.telecom.csail.mit.edu
Subject: Touch Tone Charges - Bell Canada Still Charges Extra $2.80 a month
Message-ID: <d18b2e3c217a04b268ee33b045d32a5a@192.168.222.4>
These days, pulse dialing costs more, because they have to stick an
additional 'pulse to DTMF converter' on the front of the line before
the call hits the DTMF-only switch. [This is not done] in Bell Canada
Territory - they do the reverse, [and] filter out Touch-Tone if you
are on a grandfathered rotary dial line.
Politically, however, it is a 'no sale' to try to charge a premium,
now, for what was the 'basic' service -- over what was hyped for
years, if not decades as the premium ('worth paying extra for')
services.
- This is not the thought of the people at Bell Canada (Ontario & Quebec)
Quote from 2001
On June 1, 2001, Bell Canada filed a proposal with the CRTC to
include the monthly charge for Touch-Tone service on all residential
single-line customer bills - an initiative that would have added $2.80
per month to the bills of affected customers.
"After reviewing various ways in which to address our customers'
concerns, we have decided to file to withdraw our proposal to
standardize Touch-Tone service and, instead, we will continue to
provide rotary dial service on the same basis as we have since 1993,"
Sheridan added.
Bell's existing single line residential rotary dial and digit-pulse
customers in Ontario and Quebec - numbering about 285,000 - will be
able to keep their rotary phone service at no additional charge. For
those choosing to switch to Touch-Tone, Bell is offering refurbished
Touch-Tone telephones at a 30 per cent discount, allowing customers to
take full advantage of the services.
http://bce.ca/en/news/releases/reg/2001/07/24/6243.html
Fast forward to 2009...
Bell has grandfathered all rotary dial lines - if you dont move you
dont have to pay the $2.80 a month for Touch-Tone, they put a filter
on the line so that Touch-Tone will not dial out. If you move then
Bell will start charging the $2.80 extra a month.
This was also featured in Readers Digest:
http://www.readersdigest.ca/money/cms/xcms/everyday-ripoffs_2786_a.html
Cable and Phone "Privileges" - Check out your monthly Bell Canada
bill. Chances are, there's a $2.80 charge called "touch-tone" service.
To avoid it, you'd need a rotary-dial phone, if you can find one in an
antique shop. Otherwise, that's an extra $33.60 a year!
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2009 22:30:45 EDT
From: Wesrock@aol.com
To: redacted@invalid.telecom.csail.mit.edu
Subject: Re: Pulse dialing overhead, was: ANI vs. Caller ID
Message-ID: <cd4.4f4df3d3.376c5255@aol.com>
In a message dated 6/18/2009 9:19:41 AM Central Daylight Time,
hancock4@bbs.cpcn.com writes:
> ESS also has to deal with a variety of inter-office singalling
> arrangements, which may include DC pulse transmissions and
> signalling from other offices of an older design. Now today
> everything is ESS but when these boxes came out there was still a
> great deal of step and panel out there.
I always found it somewhat amusing a No. 1 Crossbar office used
revertive pulsing for signalling, even when commnicating with another
1XB office (each of them emulating a Panel Type office). Yes, there
was a lot of Panel when 1XB came out.
Wes Leatherock
wesrock@aol.com
wleathus@yahoo.com
***** Moderator's Note *****
Were all trunks revertive? I thought #1XB was able to use MF
signalling.
Bill Horne
Temporary Moderator
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2009 02:53:22 +0000 (UTC)
From: "Adam H. Kerman" <ahk@chinet.com>
To: redacted@invalid.telecom.csail.mit.edu
Subject: Re: ANI vs. Caller ID (fwd)
Message-ID: <h1euj2$25q$6@news.albasani.net>
jmeissen@aracnet.com wrote:
>Dave Close <dave@compata.com> wrote:
>>The term "spoofing" has been used inaccurately throughout this subthread.
>>Caller-defined Caller-ID isn't spoofed unless a number has been input
>>that isn't a line number subscribed to at that call center's location
>>(or perhaps at another call center of that company). If another number
>>was input that's subscribed to by an unrelated telephone subscriber,
>>then spoofing rises to the level of forgery. And if it's done for the
>>purpose of initiating a scam, it's fraud.
>>If a meaningless string of digits was input, say 9 digits in lieu of 10
>>or nonexistant area code-prefix combination, nothing has been spoofed.
>According to Merriam-Webster, a definition of 'spoof' is 'deceive', and
>the defintion of 'deceive' is "to cause to accept as true or valid what
>is false or invalid"
Does that include quoting me, but attributing my remarks to Dave Close?
Please don't misattribute quotes on Usenet.
>So it seems to me that most, if not all, of the uses of the term
>"spoofing" have been accurate so far.
There's no deception if one hasn't revealed his identity, which is all
that's happened if someone blocks Caller ID or inputs an invalid phone
number into the field.
If you call me without telling me your name, you haven't deceived me. If
you call me, stating that your name is Fred Willard but your name is
actually John Drake, you have deceived me.
If you call me, state that your name is Fred Willard, representative of
Xerox, to sell me a photocopier maintenance service on my machine, but
you don't work for Xerox, that's fraud.
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2009 20:30:56 -0700
From: Thad Floryan <thad@thadlabs.com>
To: redacted@invalid.telecom.csail.mit.edu
Subject: 5XB arcana
Message-ID: <4A3B0670.4000305@thadlabs.com>
John Morse posted another interesting article in the Linux group which I've
copy'n'pasted below. Email to him did not succeed, so I posted a one-liner in
that group inviting him to comp.dcom.telecom; hopefully he'll join us.
Here's John's copy'n'pasted article:
Was your 5XB one of the old original flat-spring models? Perhaps you
also had an old SXS switch in the same building?
The 5XB that was beside my 1XB switch where I worked for ten years, was
a newer (c. 1966) wire-spring model. I started off as a frameman for the
1XB and 5XB. Never did get the hang of 5XB multi-line hunt and jump-hunt
wiring in the Number Groups. The 5XB switchman would work those orders.
Another C.O. had three Marker Groups, the largest in the city. Two were
wire-spring, but the oldest was a flat-spring model.
IIRC, my 1XB switch didn't have jump-hunt, but did have multi-line hunt
(block hunt). It also didn't have TouchTone. Just before I bid out to a
Teletypeman slot, I had installed TT converters on all of the 180 old
dial-pulse Subscriber Senders (5XB would call these Originating
Registers), and then they could sell TT to everybody (Dial Assignment's
job became easier).
That old 1XB switch would never give up processing calls regardless of
the load. The 5XB was a frail animal though, designed for smaller
suburban C.O.s. It could lock up under heavy traffic. A lot of the
jam-up was caused by the slowness of the mechanical Trouble Recorder,
which punched cards one after another when the going got tough. This
caused the Markers to wait on the Trouble Recorder, at least until they
timed out and dumped the call. Of course a subscriber just started over
again....
These heavy traffic events were usually on Monday mornings right after
people woke up to find an ice storm had paralyzed the city. Or after a
tornado moved across town, whether it touched down or not. It's amazing
how, after many years of listening to the din of the switch, you can get
a feel for what is happening. I worked nights, and I could actually hear
a call fail by unusual sounds back in the aisles.
I went back many years later and noticed the 5XB AMA Translator frames
were jam-packed with jumpers. Seems the Chief Switchman had gotten tired
of so many 5-Tickets from lost revenue on toll calls, due to framemen
pulling out the wrong jumpers, he ordered no more jumper removal on
disconnect orders. That caused a gradual build-up of wire until the
detecting loops were choked-full of wire. You could only unwrap and
remove a Translator jumper when you had a new connect order for that
Line Link assignment. But the framemen wouldn't pull out the wires, so
the loops were packed with disconnected tangled wires.
I imagine they also had their share of XET problems (XET = Cross in the
Electronic Translator) caused by a part of the wirewrap "spring"
breaking off and falling down between the wire-wrap studs. I'd like to
have the money the Trouble Recorder cards cost, just for all the XET
problems they had over the years!
------------------------------
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